It has been known for centuries that the rich and famous have longer lives than the poor and ordinary. Causality, however, remains trenchantly debated. The ideal experiment would be one in which extra status could somehow be dropped upon a sub-sample of individuals while those in a control group of comparable individuals received none. This paper attempts to formulate a test in that spirit. It collects 19th-century birth data on science Nobel Prize winners. Correcting for potential biases, we estimate that winning the Prize, compared to merely being nominated, is associated with between 1 and 2 years of extra longevity.
Introduction
High socio-economic status (SES) is associated with good health and long life. A famous demonstration comes from the Whitehall studies of British civil servants. The first such study (Reid et al., 1974 ) covered a large sample of male civil servants. Analysis of mortality rates for coronary heart disease (CHD) at follow-up times of 7.5 years (Marmot, Rose and Hamilton, 1978) , 10 years (Marmot, Shipley and Rose, 1984) , and beyond, found occupational grade to be an important explanatory factor. Mortality risk decreased with each extra increment in job seniority. Other research went on to confirm the independent association of grade, after controlling for known risk factors, with common diseases (Marmot, Shipley and Rose, 1984) and in women as well as men (Marmot et al., 1991; Ferrie et al., 2002) . This statistical association has now been found in many populations (Adams et al., 2003; Adler and Ostrove, 1999; Adler et al., 1993) .
Nevertheless, important questions remain about cause-and-effect: see Pearl (2000) for one of the clearest methodological discussions. At least three pathways are possible:
(i) a direct causal effect from status to health; (ii) a reverse causal path from health to status; (iii) unmeasured common causes, which produce a kind of unobserved heterogeneity. A fourth possibility (sample selection) is that statistical limitations in the data incorrectly suggest an underlying causal mechanism where there is none.
Accounts of the beneficial effects of perceived social status, and its psychobiological consequences, have been proposed by Marmot (2004) and Wilkinson (2000) . It is argued that lower levels of SES raise levels of psychological stress, and that this happens primarily through the association of low SES with low levels of job control (Marmot et al., 1991) and low levels of fall-back social support (Putnam, 2000; Marmot et al., 1991) . Empirically, lack of control in the workplace is associated with stress and depressive symptoms (Steptoe et al., 2003a; Stansfeld et al., 1999; Karasek and Theorell, 1990 ), while the degree to which an individual has social support is believed to determine the degree to which they can buffer job strain (Falk et al., 1992; Johnson and Hall, 1988) . Wilkinson (2000) proposes that perceived low social standing is linked with feelings of shame, humiliation, disrespect, and social anxiety. It is argued that strain can lead to high levels of stress hormones, and that this in turn damages immunological processes (Steptoe and Marmot, 2005) . The result is a potential pathway from SES to longevity.
Studies on rhesus macaques, in which rank can be manipulated, seem to indicate that causation runs from hierarchical position to the presence of stress hormones (Shively, 2000) . Using data on troops of wild baboons, Sapolsky (1993) shows that levels of biological stress markers follow a hierarchical pattern. However, studies of cortisol in human beings yield mixed results (Steptoe and Marmot, 2005; Kunz-Ebrecht et al., 2004 , Steptoe et al., 2003b . When social and economic status go together, as often in human life, the pursuit of social status is reinforced by the greater entitlement to economic resources. Theoretical and experimental research into the consequences of status-seeking includes Ball et al. (2001) , Brown et al. (2008) , Clark and Oswald (1998), Frank (1985) , Oswald and Powdthavee (2007) , and Rablen (2008) .
Many economists --for example Cutler et al. (2006) --have pointed out that causation may run from health to SES (so-called selection). There may also exist common factors, such as genetic heterogeneity, that influence SES and susceptibility to disease. Investigators have questioned the psychological notion of perceived social status, and wondered whether it is unworkable for policy or testing (e.g. Deaton, 2003) . Ill health leads to loss of income, so health can have a causal link to SES. Someone who expects a long life may accumulate assets to finance their retirement, and healthy workers may be paid more because of their higher productivity (Luft, 1975) . While selection is widely thought nugatory by medical scientists, economists give it greater credence. Smith (1998, 1999, 2005) argues persuasively that there are pathways from health to SES. Meer, Miller and Rosen (2003) reject causation from wealth to health in US data.
Holding constant initial health, and using the British Household Panel Survey, Gardner and Oswald (2004) find no significant effect from income on to later mortality risk. Gravelle and Sutton (2006) and Miller and Paxson (2006) do not uncover persuasive evidence of health effects from relative income. However, innovative work by Frijters, Haisken-DeNew and Shields (2005a,b) does suggest a role for income.
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A causal connection can be established from education to health (see e.g. LlerasMuney, 2005; Smith, 2005) . Adams et al. (2003) tests for the absence of direct causality from SES to health, using both economic and education measures of SES. The authors draw upon data from the Asset and Health Dynamics (AHEAD) Panel, on Americans aged 70 and older, and after conditioning upon initial health conditions cannot reject the hypothesis of no causal link from SES to overall mortality. However, for three of the top four causes of death amongst men the hypothesis of no direct causation can be rejected (Adda et al., 2003) .
Tests for the effects of social status have taken a different approach. Redelmeier and Singh (2001a) consider the longevity of Oscar winning actors and actresses relative to those who had been nominated for an award but had never won. Winning an Oscar, it is reasoned, should have a positive effect on feelings of perceived social standingparticularly because as many Americans watch the Oscar ceremony as vote in presidential elections ). The authors conclude that winners have a life expectancy 3.6 years longer than the control group of nominees. Despite this remarkable finding, a follow-up study (Redelmeier and Singh, 2001b) on Oscar winning and Oscar nominated screenwriters concluded that the unsuccessful Oscar nominees live on average longer than do winners. Thus the two papers seem to contradict each other. 
The Empirical Approach
We try to contribute to this debate. We use data on Nobel Prize winners and nominees in Physics and Chemistry between 1901 and 1950. In addition to social distinction, the prize (which can be shared by up to three people) carries an amount of $1 -$1.5 million. It is often thought (see e.g. Frey, 2005; Layard, 1980) that the intrinsic value of a Nobel Prize outweighs its monetary rewards. Accordingly, we interpret winning the Prize as primarily a one-time innovation to social status. 3 The idea that the demand for awards relies partly on individuals' desire for distinction is a plank of a nascent economic literature on awards (Frey, 2005) .
This study views the Nobel Prize as akin to an extraneous 4 or 'exogenous' boost to status. We attempt to measure the impact of winning a Nobel Prize on longevity by comparing winners to a control group, namely, scientists nominated for the Prize who 4 were unsuccessful.
Our raw data reveal that winners live just under 1.4 years longer than nominees.
However, this does not establish a causal link from winning to longevity. As all scientists must be alive at the time they are nominated for a Nobel Prize, reverse causality from longevity to winning a Nobel Prize can arise in at least two ways. First, the longer a scientist lives, the greater the chance of stumbling upon a major discovery. Weinberg and Galenson (2005) Cox (1972) . This allows us to control for heterogeneities between the two Prizes and across countries, as well as for possible sources of status other than winning a Nobel Prize. To help mitigate reverse-causality bias, we use the method of time-dependent covariates. Our final estimate here is that winners live 1.6 years longer than nominees.
Our analysis uncovers no relationship between the real value of the Prize and the longevity of Prize winners.
The sample is drawn from a published census of Nobel Prize nominees 5 in the Chemistry and Physics Prizes for the period 1901 -1950 (Crawford, 2002 . Of the 560
scientists nominated for one of these Prizes over this period, we were able to find the year 5 The statutes of the Nobel Foundation mandate that the names of nominators and their nominees are to be kept secret for a period of 50 years. Because the Nobel Prizes in Chemistry, Literature, Peace, Physiology-or-Medicine, and Physics were first awarded in 1901, there are now more than 50 years of data on nominees for these Prizes.
of death for 532 scientists using the internet search engine Google, the`Recent Deaths' column of the academic journal Science, and a rolling scientific bibliographic dictionary initiated as Poggendorff (1863) . Where possible, when information from the internet was conflicting, we used information linked to reputable published sources, such as the online entries from the Encyclopedia Britannica. Information on nationality, sex, year of birth, plus a full record of the years in which each scientist was nominated and/or won each Prize was collected from Crawford (2002) . A further three scientists are thought to be alive at time of writing. We were unable to find the year of death for the remaining 28 scientists assumed to be dead. They are therefore omitted.
Of the 532 scientists with known biographical details, we restrict attention to male Mean lifespan in the data is 76 years, measured as the area under the Kaplan-Meier survival function. This seems remarkable: it is equivalent to male life expectancy for people born in the US in 2006, yet the sample was born on average in 1876.
The baseline characteristics of winners and nominees are shown in Table 1 (standard deviations in parentheses). Winners were born several years later in time than the sample average, but the difference is not statistically significant. Demographically, 6 We count as a Physics winner any scientist who both won the Prize in Physiology-or-Medicine and who was nominated for the Physics Prize--and equivalently for chemists. This avoids (i) the necessity to somehow allow for`unsuccessful' nominees who won a Physiology-or-Medicine Prize and (ii) having to lose 12 winners. 7 Nobody has both won the Nobel Peace Prize and been nominated for (without winning) the Chemistry or Physics Prizes. However, Linus Pauling won both the Chemistry (1954) and Peace (1962) Prizes.
winners and nominees are similar. Two potentially important differences are that winners are first nominated for a Prize some ten years earlier on average than are nominees, and are also nominated in more than 1.5 times as many distinct years.
8 Second, we also decompose the data for each individual Prize. The Physics Prize has tended to draw from a smaller pool of scientists, with scientists first being nominated at a younger age and winning earlier also. Nevertheless, at least for the raw data, using a log-rank test we cannot reject the hypothesis that the estimated survival functions for each Prize are the same.
In winners and nominees in Figure 1 using a log-rank test. Second, these differences cannot be given a causal interpretation, for reasons already discussed.
There are, however, non-parametric tests that can address reverse causality. If we take two identically aged scientists, one who will never win a Nobel Prize, and another who has won a Nobel Prize, then later differences in lifespan cannot be explained in terms of a causal process from longevity to winning. We build on this idea.
Let the observed lifespan of each nominee j be denoted A . Under the null hypothesis 8 That winners were nominated 10 years earlier on average suggests that they arguably had more, and earlier, inherent status than did nominees. This does not affect the nature of the test described in this paper, but it could potentially lead to an underestimation of the true effect (if, hypothetically, those who went on to win already knew that they were particularly distinguished scientists, and thus gained less, psychologically, from the award of the Prize per se). 9 The apparent discrepancy here is due to the effect of scientists nominated for both Prizes and the effects of rounding.
that winning a Nobel Prize has no effect on longevity, the two series of numbers should have the same mean. However, this test may have low power against the null hypothesis.
To control for the growth of life expectancy over time, we limit the set of nominees over which we take expectations to those born within a small window of time of the winner.
Looking 1  year around a winner's year of birth we term a window of three years (looking 2  years corresponds to a window of five years, and so on).
Our test deliberately matches each winner with one or more nominees born in approximately the same year as the winner. The algorithm searches both forwards and backwards in time around each winner's birth year to find all nominees born within the window period of a winner's year of birth. If at least one nominee j is found such that
then the winner is said to be matched. If not all winners are matched, the algorithm increases the window size by 2  and begins again. Therefore, the window size eventually employed is the smallest that enables us to match all winners in our sample.
To estimate any upward bias in the longevity of winners due to reverse causation, we can compare the difference in means from this test using the conditional expectation
with an otherwise identical test that instead employs the
10 A problem with this test is that three scientists in our sample are still alive. Therefore we assume that each will die in the final time period (2006), which will under-estimate their true lifespans. We show later that our qualitative findings are robust to other assumptions.
The results of the conditional and unconditional matching test are reported in Table 2 . These are respectively for: the full sample; the USA; Europe (EU); the most represented European country (Germany); and the sample broken down by prize.
'Conditional' here means that winners are matched only to nominees in the window who were alive at the age the winner won the Nobel Prize. The third and fourth columns report 10 Since we are computing an unconditional mean we need only check that there exists at least one nominee in the window, the condition that
the difference in means between the lifespan of winners and nominees for the conditional and unconditional tests respectively. The unconditional differences are, by definition, uncorrected for bias, and we would therefore expect them to be positive. However, under the null hypothesis that the Nobel Prize has no effect on longevity, our corrected conditional estimates should lie around zero, with some positive and others negative.
Interestingly, contrary to this, in Table 2 we see positive differences in all the subsamples considered and for the sample as a whole. Winners go on to outlive nominees.
We obtain estimates exceeding one and two years respectively for Germany and the USA. We perform a further test that controls for unexplained variation in longevity across countries. In addition to restricting the expectation to nominees within the window, we further remove from the expectation nominees of a different nationality to the winner. Under this stricter matching rule it becomes impossible to match all winners without allowing the window size to converge towards the span of the full sample. In the row labelled 'All (controls only of winner's nationality)' we present the results for a window-size of 13 years (results at other window sizes are comparable). This procedure increases our longevity estimates for the full sample by around two-thirds of a year.
Comparing the third and fourth columns in Table 2 yields initial estimates of the effect of conditioning on nominees living to at least the age their matched winner won a Nobel Prize. These estimates range from 2.56 years for the US to only 0.67 years for the EU. This is, then, an initial measure of the extent to which winners wrongly appear to live longer due to causality from longevity to winning a Nobel Prize. A final thing to note from Table 2 is that the conditional test appears to exacerbate differences between the two Prizes, with no apparent winning effect visible for the Physics Prize. Again, however, it is worth treating this apparent finding with caution as the Physics and Chemistry subsamples are heterogeneous in many respects.
The three scientists still alive have a current average age of 90.7 years. It is a simplification to assume that all die in 2006. Were we to assume that all three live to 110 it falls to 0.19, but nevertheless remains positive. One of the scientists is German, but is not matched to any German winner by the grouping algorithm, so the German result of 1.30 years is unaffected. Another of the scientists is American. Were he to live to 110, we still estimate a 1.87 year life gain for the USA.
Given the amount of noise in lifespan data, the size of sample, and the relatively small effect we are trying to isolate, we would not expect to find statistical significance at conventional levels from such a test. Nevertheless, the fact that the conditional matching test yields positive estimates from the full sample and all the main sub-samples, with the estimates in the most homogeneous sub-samples being the highest, is suggestive.
The 'All' result of one-third of a year from winning a Nobel Prize is probably too low. When Americans are matched with fellow Americans, Germans with Germans, and EU scientists with others from the EU, the longevity effects of winning are between twothirds of a year and 2 years. However, it is true to say that the non-parametric tests considered here are not capable of providing precise measures of the degree to which winners out-live nominees. This issue is addressed later.
We now estimate a hazard model to the data. The advantage of this approach over that of the previous section is that it produces estimates of the effect of longevity from winning a Nobel Prize in an environment where we control for confounding influences, In choosing the covariates we control for systematic differences between winners and nominees on dimensions that are possible sources of status (other than from winning a Nobel Prize). It might be that being a successful scientist over a prolonged period is an important source of status independent of winning the Prize. This would produce confounding influences since winners are nominated over 1.8 times more years than nominees (Table 1) . We therefore include as a covariate the number of distinct years each scientist was nominated for either of the two Prizes: the idea being that scientists were at the top of their respective fields during the period in which they received nominations.
A second variable we include is a scientist's age at first nomination. Winners are younger when first nominated (Table 1) . We allow for differences between Prizes with a dummy variable 'Chemistry'. Dummies are included for country-specific effects.
Finally, we must deal with the issue of reverse causality. This is done using timedependent covariates within the PH model. Specifically, we estimate a model in which there is a step function for winning a Nobel Prize, such that a scientist is coded as a nominee until they win the Prize, and as a winner thereafter. Table 3 treats time-zero as the year of nomination. We term the analyses in Table   3 as 'probability-of-death' equations, which, while not literally accurate, is to make clear that negative entries are associated with longer observed lifespans, while positive entries are associated with shorter observed lifespans. More precisely, the columns marked '% Mortality' show the percentage change in the relative mortality rate associated with a given covariate. In column I of Table 3 , it can be seen that those who win a Nobel Prize exhibit lower mortality than the control group (that is, those nominated for the Nobel
Prize but who did not win). The reduction is estimated at 21%. Column II leads to a fractionally larger estimate; it allows for a further range of dummy variables.
The comparable analysis of Oscar winners and nominees by Redelmeier and Singh (2001a) reported a 24-25% decline in relative mortality. It should be emphasized that here we allow for time co-varying variables. 'Winner' enters as a step function, but age is also included as a time-varying influence. For each scientist, the age variable changes by an increment of +1 each year up until the age of death. Age is allowed to enter flexibly into the model as a linear spline function with knots at the 33 rd and 66 th percentiles. This gives three variables, as shown in the Table. Two dummy variables in Our key finding here is that winners live 1.62 years longer than nominees.
Paralleling Table 1 , we also find an increased mortality risk associated with chemists relative to physicists, although we are unsure as to why. 12 Regression II shows that these qualitative conclusions continue to hold in the presence of further controls.
The analyses of Redelmeier and Singh (2001a,b) do not perform this kind of test and therefore do not allow fully for possible reverse causality and endogeneity biases. The results of this analysis are shown in columns III and IV of Table 3 . We collected data on the fraction of the Nobel Prize won by each scientist in the winner group, and the real value of the prize-fund (in thousand Swedish Kronor). The covariate 'Prize Money'
is the interaction between the fraction of the Prize won and the total prize fund (i.e. the amount the scientist actually received). Regression III in Table 3 shows that, amongst the winners, age is a statistically significant predictor of longevity. However, this conclusion must again be treated with caution due to endogeneity bias. Nevertheless, this result suggests to us that the weight of evidence favors the position that those who enter the fray later reap greater rewards in longevity.
Importantly, there is no statistically discernible relationship between mortality and either the real value of the total prize fund, the prize money received by the individual scientist, or the fraction of the Prize won. The finding is compatible with existing evidence, presented in the Introduction, on the apparently weak role of income and wealth in explaining health outcomes. If anything, although poorly determined, the real value of the prize money received by the individual scientist enters with an unexpected sign that implies that the higher the amount received, the higher the mortality risk. Rablen and Oswald (2007) reports some additional tests performed solely on the nominees. A possible reason why the`years nominated (#)' covariate may appear insignificant in the pooled analysis is that winners cease being nominated after winning the Prize. Nevertheless, were a prolonged period of nominations an important source of status we would expect this to be evident when analyzing the nominees separately.
However, we find no statistically discernible relationship among nominees between mortality and years of nomination. If anything, more years of nominations are associated with shorter lifespans. Perhaps consistent with this, some research in social psychology suggests that the well-being of those who just miss out on a prize is reduced by the 13 Winning multiple Nobel Prizes may bring additional status. As only two people have done so, there are not the data to examine this.
tendency to think about what might have been (Medvec, Gilovich and Madey, 1995) .
Conclusion
This study finds that Nobel Prize winners go on to have longer lives than scientists who are merely nominated. Although it is important to treat these results cautiously, they appear to be consistent with a causal link between status and later lifespan. and the theory does not explain why Oscar-winning screenwriters engage in behavior more deleterious to health than do other screenwriters. Nevertheless, were behavioral 14 It is may be worth recording that when we began this exercise we were sceptical and thought that once proper corrections were done there might well be no discernible longevity effect left. We remain concerned about the chance of false positives (see the useful discussion in Sterne and Ioannidis, 2005) in statistical research of this kind. We are also conscious that our test depends on the assumption that winners and nominees are, ex ante, intrinsically as healthy as one another.
factors the true culprit, we would argue that our study may be less susceptible to such factors. So far as we know, academics are not renowned for the mixture of drugs, drink, sex, violence, monstrous egos, gangsterism, speed, and madness that Davey argues characterizes the lives of Hollywood directors. 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 Real Value (Thousand Kr.)
Note: In the regression equations of Table 3 , this data series is used only up to the early 1950s. Recent winners of the Nobel Prize cannot be included in the sample. 
